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Abstract
The international sharing of virus data is critical for protecting populations against le-
thal infectious disease outbreaks. Scientists must rapidly share information to assess
the nature of the threat and develop new medical countermeasures. Governments
need the data to trace the extent of the outbreak, initiate public health responses,
and coordinate access to medicines and vaccines. Recent outbreaks suggest, however,
that the sharing of such data cannot be taken for granted – making the timely inter-
national exchange of virus data a vital global challenge. This article undertakes the
ﬁrst analysis of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Inﬂuenza Data as an innovative
policy effort to promote the international sharing of genetic and associated inﬂuenza
virus data. Based onmore than 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with key in-
formants in the international community, coupled with analysis of a wide range of
primary and secondary sources, the article ﬁnds that the Global Initiative on Sharing
All Inﬂuenza Data contributes to global health in at least ﬁve ways: (1) collating the
most complete repository of high-quality inﬂuenza data in the world; (2) facilitating
the rapid sharing of potentially pandemic virus information during recent outbreaks;
(3) supporting the World Health Organization’s biannual seasonal ﬂu vaccine strain
selection process; (4) developing informal mechanisms for conﬂict resolution around
the sharing of virus data; and (5) building greater trust with several countries key to
global pandemic preparedness.
Introduction
The rapid spread of lethal infectious diseases is a global chal-
lenge potentially affecting any person living around the world.
Already on multiple occasions in the 21st century, a deadly
new infectious disease emerged suddenly and then quickly
spread through the dense network of international circula-
tions that make up our globalized world – from HIV/AIDS
and SARS, through pandemic ﬂu andMERS, to recent experi-
ences with Ebola and now the Zika virus.1 Sharing
Impact Statement: The rapid spread of lethal infectious diseases is a global challenge potentially affecting any person around
the world. To protect populations against such deadly outbreaks, it is critical that scientists and governments rapidly share in-
formation about the pathogens causing them.Without access to such information, it will be very difﬁcult to properly assess the
risk posed to global health, to develop new medical countermeasures, and to mount a commensurate international response.
However, recent outbreaks suggest several impediments to the rapid sharing of virus data. Scientist may wish to withhold data
until their scholarly studies are published; governments are fearful about the repercussions of being associated with a major
new outbreak, and it remains challenging to fund global public goods like an international database to host such data. Through
the ﬁrst study of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Inﬂuenza Data (GISAID), this article shows how it is possible to encourage
the greater international sharing of such data through the careful design of new sharingmechanisms. GISAID has now devel-
oped a successful track-record in the ﬁeld of inﬂuenza that may also serve as a useful blueprint for managing other diseases and
global challenges requiring the international sharing of sensitive data.
1“Beneﬁts of sharing”. Nature. 11 February 2016, p. 129.
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information on the viruses that cause such outbreaks is critical
to protecting global health. Scientists need to rapidly share
their information with other scientists around the world to
understand the nature of the threat and to develop new med-
ical countermeasures. Governments need the data to trace the
extent of the outbreak, to coordinate public health interven-
tions, and to ensure that populations have access to medicines
and vaccines. All of this is particularly important in the case of
ﬂu, because of the comparatively rapid rate at which inﬂuenza
viruses change, and the lurking spectre of a potentially
devastating human pandemic. However, recent infectious
disease outbreaks suggest that such international cooperation
cannot be taken for granted and point to three impediments
potentially hampering the timely sharing of such critical
virus data.
First, scientists may hesitate to share data on lethal viruses
because they are concerned about other researchers using this
data to publish scholarly articlesmore quickly than they them-
selves are able to – meaning that their scientiﬁc contributions
would not be properly acknowledged and recognized. Second,
governments might also interfere with the international ex-
change of information because of concerns about the negative
economic ramiﬁcations of being identiﬁed as the source coun-
try for an international outbreak. Theymay also wish to retain
ownership over any intellectual property potentially residing
in such data and – particularly for low- and middle-income
countries – will wish to ensure that they can secure access to
new vaccines or medicines developed on the basis of that co-
operation. Finally, even where these two challenges can be
overcome, there is still a much more practical obstacle in
terms of who will actually provide the international leader-
ship, legitimacy, coordination, and funding needed for sus-
taining the material infrastructures essential for collecting,
curating, and distributing such virus data. The international
sharing of virus data may be critical to global health, but it is
also enveloped in a Gordian knot of complex policy
challenges.
The Global Initiative on Sharing All Inﬂuenza Data is an
initiative aimed at untying that knot. Initially spurred by the
global threat posed by human infections with highly patho-
genic avian inﬂuenza (H5N1), GISAID introduced a new
mechanism for incentivizing and promoting the international
sharing of inﬂuenza virus data. GISAID’s pivotal innovation
consists of governing access to the data through a unique data
access agreement extending a number of key “protections”
and assurances to data contributors. In order to access the
new database, users would ﬁrst have to positively identify
themselves through an initial registration and log-in process
so that access to the data could be monitored. As part of
that initial procedure, users would also agree to acknowledge
those who submitted the data in their publications and to
make best efforts to work collaboratively with data contrib-
utors on scientiﬁc publications. Users would further have to
agree not to share the data with third parties outside the
GISAID community and would also not seek to place any
restrictions on the use of the data. Through extending such
additional “protections,” it was hoped that the GISAID
mechanism could actively incentivize scientists and govern-
ments around the world to share inﬂuenza virus data in a
timelier manner.
Impact Box:
What challenges does the study address?
The timely international sharing of virus data is critical for protecting populations against lethal infectious disease outbreak. Without access to such
information, it is very difﬁcult to properly assess the risk posed to global health, to develop new diagnostics, medicines and vaccines, and to mount
a commensurate international response. However, experiences with recent outbreaks suggest that there are three challenges when it comes to sharing
virus data. First, scientists may hesitate to share data on lethal viruses because they are concerned about other researchers then using this data to publish
scholarly articles more quickly than they can do themselves –meaning their scientiﬁc contribution is not properly acknowledged and recognized. Sec-
ond, governments might interfere with the international exchange of information because of concerns about the negative economic ramiﬁcations of
being identiﬁed as the source country of an international outbreak. They may also wish to retain ownership over any potential intellectual property
associated with the data and – particularly for low- and middle-income countries – will be keen to ensure that they can secure access to new vaccines
or medicines subsequently developed on the basis of that cooperation. Finally, there is also a more practical public goods challenge in terms of who will
actually provide the funding and material infrastructure for hosting such virus data.
What is new about the research?
This research presents the ﬁrst study of a new mechanism for encouraging the international sharing of virus data that has been created in the ﬁeld of
inﬂuenza. Initially spurred by the global threat posed by human infections with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (H5N1), the Global Initiative on
Sharing All Inﬂuenza Data (GISAID) was launched in 2008 as a new mechanism for incentivizing and promoting the international sharing of virus
data.
What are the implications of the research?
The research shows how it is possible to overcome some of the challenges associated with the international sharing of virus data through the skillful
design of new sharing mechanisms that are sensitive to the needs of stakeholders. Already, this important sharing mechanism has developed a suc-
cessful track-record in the ﬁeld of inﬂuenza and may also serve as a useful blueprint for other diseases and global challenges that depend on the
international sharing of sensitive data. The research further shows how philanthropic actors can play an important role in bringing about novel
global health initiatives and how important it is to build trust in new global health initiatives. Finally, the research also illustrates how innovative
solutions to global challenges can be found when lessons are creatively applied from one issue area to another and that such cross-sectoral learning
should be encouraged.
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As GISAID marks its tenth anniversary, this article under-
takes the ﬁrst in-depth analysis of its wider contribution to
global health. The primary source material for the analysis
comes from more than 20 semistructured, background inter-
views conducted with key informants in the international
community. Those stakeholders were drawn from the inter-
national scientiﬁc community, government institutions,
pharmaceutical companies, research institutes, international
organizations, andmany of those involved in creating GISAID
itself. Additional primary and secondary source material was
identiﬁed in the form of policy papers, background papers,
working papers, ofﬁcial documents, articles and books on vi-
rus sharing produced by science journalists, governments,
think tanks, scientists, and international organizations. The
article argues that GISAID is making at least ﬁve key contribu-
tions to global health: (1) collating the most complete reposi-
tory of high-quality inﬂuenza data in the world; (2) facilitating
the rapid sharing of potentially pandemic virus information
during recent outbreaks; (3) supporting the World Health
Organization’s biannual seasonal ﬂu vaccine strain selection
process; (4) developing informal mechanisms for conﬂict
resolution; and (5) building greater trust with several
low-income and middle-income countries key to pandemic
preparedness.
Obstacles to the international sharing
of virus data
The international exchange of inﬂuenza virus data, including
for viruses with human pandemic potential, is particularly im-
portant because inﬂuenza viruses evolve more rapidly than
many other viruses.2 Inﬂuenza, in other words, is a fast mov-
ing target. A World Inﬂuenza Centre was thus established at
the Medical Research Council’s National Institute for Medical
Research in London in 1948. The World Health Organization
(WHO) subsequently assumed the coordinating role for inﬂu-
enza virological surveillance with the establishment of the
Global Inﬂuenza Surveillance Network (GISN) in 1952 –
renamed the Global Inﬂuenza Surveillance and Response
System (GISRS) in 2011.3 The network gradually expanded
over subsequent decades, with a small number of laboratories
becoming designated core WHO Collaborating Centres and
receiving specimens/viruses for analysis from currently
approximately 140 WHO-designated National Inﬂuenza
Centres located in more than 100 countries around the world.
Much of this early inﬂuenza work was carried out on the
basis of biological characteristics of the viruses. As genetic se-
quencing technology became more widely available over the
past two decades, however, so too genetic sequence data be-
camemore central to the process.4 At the same time, and with
laboratories now sequencing more and more inﬂuenza vi-
ruses, it was also becoming evident that in practice much of
these data were not being shared and not being made public.5
That is because there are at least three obstacles to the timely
international sharing of inﬂuenza virus data.
Science, publications and recognition
The intensely competitive nature of science is one reason why
virus data may not be shared in a timely manner. In a context
where the standing of scientists, and the research income they
can generate, is heavily linked to their publications, citations,
and scientiﬁc reputations, there is pressure to be the “ﬁrst”
to publish ﬁndings – especially about a lethal new virus.
Several interviewees expressed the view that scientists are con-
cerned that sharing such information in an open and timely
manner might enable others to publish ﬁndings with their
data more quickly than they themselves could – meaning that
their scientiﬁc contribution in discovering and analysing a
new virus would not be properly credited and acknowledged
(Longo and Drazen, 2016; Pearson, 2006). Indeed, a number
of interviewees expressed concerns about other researchers
who just “crunch” the data generated and made available by
others, without contributing to the generation of such data
themselves,6 as well as the importance of end users giving ap-
propriate credit to originators.7 Scientists from low-income
andmiddle-income countries have also complained that anal-
yses from samples they shared in the past (because they lacked
the powerful molecular research capacity of laboratories in
high-income countries) have subsequently been presented at
international meetings and conferences without proper ad-
vance notiﬁcation, or without including those who had shared
the samples in the authorship arrangements (Sedyaningsih
et al., 2008). Historically, some scientists have therefore de-
cided to share such virus information in public databases only
after their scientiﬁc papers had been published – leading to
2Interview with Philip Dormitzer, Vice President and CSO: Viral Vaccines,
Pﬁzer Vaccine Research and Development. 24 March 2015.
3Interview with Alan Hay, former Director of the WHO Collaborating Centre
(World Inﬂuenza Centre) in London (1993 to 2009); Co-Chair of Scientiﬁc
Advisory Council and Scientiﬁc Liaison Ofﬁcer of GISAID. 15 September 2014.
4Interview with Alan Hay.
5Interview with JohnMcCauley,WHOCollaborating Centre for Reference and
Research on Inﬂuenza, Crick Worldwide Inﬂuenza Centre. 9 February 2015.
6Interview with Gwenaelle Dauphin, Animal Health Service, Animal Produc-
tion andHealthDivision, Food andAgricultureOrganization of the United Na-
tions, 9 October 2015; Interview with Yuelong Shu, Director of WHO
Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Inﬂuenza, Beijing. 4 June
2014; Interview with John McCauley.
7Interview with Ian Brown, Director of EU/OIE/FAO International Reference
Laboratory for Avian Inﬂuenza and Newcastle Disease. 16 September 2014; In-
terview with Alan Hay.
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delays in the international sharing of data to the potential
detriment of global health.8
This obstacle to the timely sharing of inﬂuenza virus data
became all the more disconcerting when, in 2003, lethal
human infections with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
H5N1 viruses reemerged in Hong Kong. Those human deaths
raised the specter of a potentially muchmore devastating pan-
demic, with the human mortality rate of the virus reported by
WHO at around 60%.With somuch concern, fear, and atten-
tion now centring on the lethal H5N1 virus, the possible rep-
utational beneﬁts to scientists from being the ﬁrst to publish
analyses of the viruses were all the greater. It is precisely dur-
ing such high-proﬁle times that everyone wants to get there
“ﬁrst”.9 At the same time, the scientists at the forefront of such
new outbreaks also suddenly become extremely busy, as their
laboratories have to go into overdrive and often do not have
enough resources tomeet this surge in demand, whilst the pri-
ority in these circumstances is to generate science and evi-
dence in support of control programmes.10 With an
increased workload, scientists would have even less time than
usual to write up their ﬁndings, meaning, there was a real risk
that information critical to global health would not be shared
quickly. Even though the need for sharing data is arguably
much greater in the context of the threat of a human pan-
demic, so too are the obstacles to achieving such international
sharing of virus data in practice.
Governments, trade and access to medicines
Governments may have additional reasons for not wanting
data about lethal viruses to be shared internationally. They
could be concerned with the negative economic ramiﬁcations
of being identiﬁed as the county at the source of a lethal new
outbreak,11 and do not wish to be seen as the country that
“caused” a devastating human pandemic.12 There can also be
intellectual property considerations surrounding such samples
and information, which could be critical to the commercial de-
velopment of new diagnostics, vaccines, and medicines.13
Indeed, low-income andmiddle-income countries in particular
will be concerned to ensure access to any new medicines and
vaccines produced with the help of such samples and data –
as new medical countermeasures may later turn out to be too
costly or only available in insufﬁcient quantities.14
Many of these issues came to a fore in 2006 when, amidst
intense concern about a possible ﬂu pandemic, media reports
surfaced about critical H5N1 sequence data not being made
freely accessible to all countries – raising issues around fair-
ness in accessing such data (Brown, 2006). It also emerged
that new pandemic vaccines were being developed on the ba-
sis of biological samples initially obtained from affected coun-
tries in southeast Asia, but that originating countries were not
consulted over the subsequent movement and sharing of such
viruses with third parties (especially with industry) – raising
additional concerns about the transparency of the GISN shar-
ing mechanism (Sedyaningsih et al., 2008). Later, it transpired
that once new H5N1 vaccines had been developed, they were
not economically viable for many of those affected countries
that had initially shared samples.15 Confronted with the pros-
pect of having to ride out a ﬂu pandemic without access to the
same medical countermeasures available to many high-in-
come countries, governments of affected countries began to
openly question whom the sharing of virus samples through
the GISN actually beneﬁtted.
All these issues culminated in a lengthy and acrimonious
diplomatic dispute over international virus sharing. The dis-
pute was triggered when Indonesia (at the time experiencing
the highest number of human cases of H5N1 infection) unex-
pectedly decided to stop sharing “its” virus samples from 20
December 2006 – marking the start of protracted, high-level
diplomatic negotiations surrounding the equity, fairness,
and transparency of inﬂuenza virus sharing (Supari, 2008).
In terms of global health security, Indonesia’s decision was
regarded as a potential disaster in the sense that WHO now
did not have a complete picture of how H5N1 was spreading
and evolving16; but it also exposed the deeper political sensi-
tivities around the international sharing of virus samples that
would need to be addressed. As genetic sequence data of inﬂu-
enza viruses was becoming increasingly central to pandemic
preparedness efforts, similar sensitivities emerged around
such data as well.8Interview with JohnMcCauley. Interview with Nancy Cox, former Director of
the Inﬂuenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta. 17
September 2014.
9Interview with Alan Hay.
10Interview with Ian Brown, Director of EU/OIE/FAO International Reference
Laboratory for Avian Inﬂuenza and Newcastle Disease. 16 September 2014.
11Interview with Ilaria Capua, former Head of the Virology Department at
Istituto Zooproﬁlattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, Padova. 22 June 2015.
12Interview with Nancy Cox.
13Interview with Philip Dormitzer; Interview with Ron Fouchier, Professor in
Molecular Virology, Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC Rotterdam. 15
September 2014. See also Mary Quick. ‘Non-WHO global initiative on sharing
avian inﬂuenza data’. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 6(10): 621. October 2006.
14Pearson, ‘Plan to pool bird-ﬂu data takes off’, p. 963.
15‘Statement by the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia H. E. DR.
Dr. Siti Fadilah Supari’. November 2007. Available at: http://www.ip-watch.
org/ﬁles/Indonesia_statement_WHO.pdf. [Accessed 11 January 2016].
16Interview with Robert Webster, Emeritus faculty, Department of Infectious
Diseases St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis. 10 July 2015; see also
Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, ‘’Sovereignty’ That Risks Global
Health’. Washington Post. 10 August 2008.
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Practical challenges: funding databases
sustainably
There is also a much more practical obstacle to the sharing of
virus data. Somebody needs to provide the international lead-
ership, legitimacy, coordination, and funding necessary for
maintaining the material infrastructures central to collecting,
curating, and distributing such data. A database will require
both a physical infrastructure, as well as scientiﬁc oversight
to design the database, curate the information, liaise with lab-
oratories around the world, and so forth. Yet several inter-
viewees described just how difﬁcult it is to secure funding
for databases. They are not seen as glamorous or important
as research projects,17 or indeed as an essential part of scien-
tiﬁc intercourse that are central to advancement of scientiﬁc
research.18 Unlike funding for research projects, moreover,
databases also require continuous and even indeﬁnite funding
commitments, which many funders can be loath to agree to.19
Nevertheless, such an inﬂuenza database was initially created
in the USA, by the Los Alamos National Laboratories in New
Mexico, with funding from the US Centers for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (CDC).20 The database was created around
the time of the ﬁrst outbreak of lethal human infections with
H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997 and worked well for some
years.21 However, when H5N1 began to spread internationally
in 2004, it became clear that a number of affected countries
were very sensitive about sharing H5N1 virus information
and did not want WHO to release the data to others without
their permission (Roos, 2006). As a way of acknowledging
and addressing such concerns, those overseeing the Los Alamos
database decided to create a separate, password-protected com-
partment from the seasonal ﬂu database that would only be
open to those working on sequencing H5 viruses.22
Creating this private H5 compartment may have been a
practical solution to the diplomatic sensitivities and tensions
that were rapidly surfacing, but it also created new problems.
Some scientists expressed frustration that without access to this
compartment, they could not properly analyse how the viruses
they were isolating related to the other viruses circulating inter-
nationally.23 There was also a perception that the private com-
partment at Los Alamos was somewhat of a “club”, where only
a limited group of scientists enjoyed access.24 One scientist to
vocally draw public attention to this problem was the Italian
veterinary scientist Ilaria Capua. In February 2006, her labo-
ratory received a sample of an avian inﬂuenza virus infecting
birds in Nigeria (Zamiska, 2006a). There was great scientiﬁc
interest in the new sample because it was the ﬁrst to come
from Africa. Capua was thus offered access to the private
compartment in return for sharing her ﬁndings with the
Los Alamos database.25 Capua, however, declined the offer
and instead deposited the genetic sequence information in
the public domain archive Genbank. Her decision to take a
stand against that system, to challenge the status quo, and
to invite other leading scientists to join her in pushing for
a change of approach, attracted much scientiﬁc attention
and media coverage at the time.26 With unfavourable media
attention surrounding the Los Alamos database, combined
with the lack of a sustainable funding mechanism, as well
as decreasing support from the US CDC, there was now a
need to ﬁnd a new home where such inﬂuenza virus data
could be shared.27
A new Global Initiative on Sharing All
Inﬂuenza Data (GISAID)
The idea for an improved way of promoting the international
sharing of inﬂuenza virus sequences was initially discussed in
2006, with the call for a new global initiative on sharing avian
ﬂu data (Zamiska, 2006b). Eventually, becoming the Global
Initiative on Sharing All Inﬂuenza Data, GISAID’s genesis
was closely associated with Peter Bogner – a studio executive
with a background in creating and licensing media content,28
and in philanthropic behind-the-scenes work for organiza-
tions such as the United Nations and UNICEF.29 Bogner pro-
vided the lion’s share of funding for setting up GISAID (a low-
mid seven ﬁgure sum) and was key to the development of the
licensing mechanism that deﬁnes the GISAID data sharing
policy.30 As chief executive of its management board, he re-
mains closely involved in the initiative to this day.31
17Interview with an expert in computational biology. 23 February 2015; Inter-
view with a European expert in research and biotechnologies issues, formerly
working in the European Commission. 19 February 2015.
18Interview with Alan Hay.
19Interview with Catherine Macken, Bioinformatics Institute of the University
of Auckland, New Zealand. 17. December 2015.
20Interview with Nancy Cox.
21Interview with Ilaria Capua.
22Interview with Nancy Cox.
23Interview with Ron Fouchier.
24Interview with Ilaria Capua. See also Steven Salzberg. ‘The Contents of the
Syringe’. Nature 454. 10 July 2008, p. 161.
25Interview with Ilaria Capua.
26Interview with Nancy Cox.
27Interview withMasato Tashiro, former Director, WHOCollaborating Centre
for Reference and Research on Inﬂuenza, Japan, 5 June 2014; Interview with
Catherine Macken.
28‘Rock’n Rollouts’. Multichannel New International. November/December
1995; Hans-Juergen Jakobs, ‘Der V-Faktor’, Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 10 January
2005.
29Peter Bogner was Co-Chair of the UNICEF Entertainment Support Commit-
tee. Letter from Horst Cerni. 2. September 1988
30Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.).
18. January 2016; RobinMcDowell, ‘Indonesia agrees to hand bird ﬂu informa-
tion to new online database’. The Associated Press. 16 May 2008.
31Correspondence for the Meeting between German Government with
GISAID. Bundesministerium fuer Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft. 18. March
2015.
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Remarkably, Bogner had no background in inﬂuenza – or
even global health more broadly – prior to his involvement
in GISAID, although he did have extensive experience with
media and global affairs more generally. In 2006, a number
of events would begin to draw him more closely into the
world of inﬂuenza.
Bogner’s interest in pandemic preparedness was originally
piqued during a breakfast with Michael Chertoff (then
United States Secretary of Homeland Security) and a small
group of executives at the World Economic Forum in Davos
in January 2006. Not long thereafter, Bogner was also asked
by the New York Ofﬁce of the United Nations Secretary
General to use his extensive media contacts to look into
unfavourable media claims alleging that WHO was operating
a “secret” database in Los Alamos for genetic sequences of
highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) viruses and ﬁrst
liaised with Dr. Margaret Chan, who would subsequently be-
come Director General of the WHO.32 In April 2006, Bogner
then attended a scientiﬁc inﬂuenza meeting in Cambridge
where he met Nancy Cox, who that year became head of the
inﬂuential inﬂuenza division at US CDC. Sharing a ride with
Bogner back to London, Cox had an opportunity to elaborate
upon the challenges surrounding pandemic preparedness and
the importance of international inﬂuenza sample and data
sharing (Zamiska, 2006b).
As Bogner became more understanding of the complexities
involved, he also learned from Cox of Indonesia’s dilemma
surrounding a particularly disconcertingH5N1 virus outbreak
in Karo, Sumatra – where limited human to human transmis-
sion could not be immediately ruled out. Given his political
connections in Indonesia, Bogner was able to secure ameeting
to speak directly with the Indonesian Minister of Health Siti
Supari, who was leading Indonesia’s approach to these issues.
Eventually Bogner was even able to persuade Supari to share
the sequences of the Karo cluster, resulting in their deposit
in Genbank.33 It was an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough,
and a decision quickly met with reciprocity by the US CDC,
when Cox not long thereafter announced that they too would
be making inﬂuenza data publically accessible (Quick, 2006).
By this time, Bogner had become deeply immersed in the is-
sues around the international sharing of inﬂuenza virus
data.34
The creation of GISAID moved a step closer when the in-
ﬂuential scientiﬁc journalNature published a prominent letter
signed by more than 70 leading scientists (including seven
Nobel laureates) in August 2006. The letter – coauthored by
Peter Bogner, Ilaria Capua, Nancy Cox, and David Lipman –
proposed the creation of a new global consortium that would
foster international sharing of avian inﬂuenza isolates and data
(Bogner et al., 2006). The letter, whose signatures included
many researchers and ofﬁcials from countries directly affected
byH5N1, stated the intention for scientists participating in the
consortium to share their sequence data, to analyse ﬁndings
jointly, and to publish results collaboratively.35 Although ini-
tially only members of the consortium would be able to access
the data, as soon as possible following analysis and validation
(and no longer than six months later), the data would then be
deposited in publicly available databases that are part of the
International Sequence Database Collaboration (e.g. EMBL,
DDBJ, and Genbank).36
Bogner was prominently listed as ﬁrst author of the Nature
letter and coined the acronym GISAID.37 However, along
with a number of other inﬂuenza scientists, he was also aware
that notwithstanding its good intentions, the brief letter still
lacked much practical detail, and that the core issues of trans-
parency and equity of data sharing would likely remain unre-
solved if data archives with anonymous access to data (like
Genbank) were used. Ultimately, they felt, the sharing of such
data would only work if any rights to the data that may exist
would remain untouched through the process of sharing.38
Moving things forward in practice would thus necessitate
much more extensive consultation with a range of different
stakeholders and mediating the development of a new system
satisfying their various needs and concerns. At this point,
Bogner set out to use his considerable knowledge of media
and licensing issues, along with a pool of legal experts in intel-
lectual property, government lawyers, as well as the help of
key inﬂuenza experts, to develop a new mechanism that
would permit the sharing of data without delay in a publicly
accessible and free database, yet to be developed.39 Over the
next 18months, those efforts would focus on three key areas:
(1) developing and negotiating with Members States the legal
terms for a new database access agreement; (2) the technical
design of a new inﬂuenza database; and (3) agreeing the initia-
tive’s governance structure.
An innovative approach to data sharing: the
GISAID data access agreement
How could a new system better incentivize the international
sharing of virus data? One possible way forward would be to32Email Correspondence between Margaret Chan and Peter Bogner. 17 March
2006.
33CIDRAP, ’Indonesia, FAO, OIE pledge to publish H5N1 data’. 3 August
2006. Available at: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2006/08/in-
donesia-fao-oie-pledge-publish-h5n1-data. [Accessed 11 January 2016]; Email
correspondence between Peter Bogner and Nancy Cox. 3 August 2006; Email
correspondence between John Sulston and Peter Bogner. 5 August 2006.
34McDowell, “Indonesia agrees to hand bird ﬂu information”.
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Interview with Peter Bogner, Chairman of GISAID (Freunde von GISAID
e.V.). 28 November 2013.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
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try and provide data contributors with additional protections
and assurances about how their data would be used. This
could be performed through the careful legal design of a
new data agreement governing the submitters’ deposits of,
and users’ access to, such inﬂuenza virus data. From late
2006 onwards, Bogner thus engaged a number of former col-
leagues and lawyers who had worked with him on intellectual
property issues during his broadcasting days to help realize a
new data licensing agreement.40 Additional scientiﬁc input
to this agreement, particularly in terms of providing the scien-
tiﬁc language for the sharing agreement and helping to deﬁne
the data, came from the Scientiﬁc Advisory Council (SAC).
Constituted early on by GISAID, the SAC was initially chaired
by Nancy Cox from the US CDC and is composed of fellow
WHO Collaborating Centre directors and FAO/OIE Refer-
ence Laboratory counterparts, as well as established re-
searchers in the ﬁelds of epidemiology, human virology,
veterinary virology, and bioinformatics. The SAC is now co-
chaired by Nancy Cox and John McCauley of the Crick
Institute.
Developing this new data access agreement (DAA) would
require Bogner to travel extensively around the world in an ef-
fort to forge an international consensus on a novel sharing
mechanism enabling public and animal health authorities to
continue their surveillance work, that ensured manufacturers
of medical countermeasures could continue their work on de-
veloping vaccines, antivirals, or diagnostic kits, and that also
provided a transparent mechanism for researchers who had
the publication of their manuscripts as their main focus.41
GISAID’s resulting DAA, which came into force in May
2008, retained the principle of a publicly accessible
database – meaning that any natural person (whether
scientist or not) could obtain credentials to access data in
GISAID, predicated upon a one-time positive veriﬁcation of
the individual’s identity, and agreement to the terms of the
DAA, which license the use of data in GISAID.42 This process
of positively identifying the contributors and users of data dif-
fers from the anonymous access afforded to public domain ar-
chives (like Genbank), but provides GISAID with the
mechanism for enforcement, and makes users adhere to the
rules set forth in the DAA. Further beneﬁts of this system
are that it makes it easier for scientists to discover and properly
acknowledge those who contributed the data and to also assist
with any biosecurity considerations that could potentially
arise around the use of some such data.43
The core provisions of the DAA thus include that users: (1)
will share their own data and allow other users to access it; (2)
that they will not share or distribute data submitted directly to
the GISAID sharing mechanism to other non-GISAID servers
or to individuals/institutions who are not registered GISAID
users; (3) that they will credit the use of others’ data in publi-
cations; (4) that they will make best efforts to collaborate with
the originating laboratory and involve them in analyses and
further research involving the data; (5) that they will analyse
ﬁndings jointly; and (6) that they will maintain common ac-
cess to technology derived from the data so that it can be used
not only for research but also for the development of medical
interventions such as diagnostics, vaccines, or antivirals. Ac-
cording to the agreement, GISAID users thus have the right
to develop a commercial product on the basis of data obtained
through GISAID, but they may not impose any terms on the
data itself (which remains the sole property of the contribu-
tor), and they must also seek to collaborate with the data
contributors.44
Most crucially of all, and notwithstanding its status as a
publically accessible database, GISAIDwould therefore not fall
under the legal deﬁnition of “Public Domain”, because the
GISAID license respects the ownership of data submissions
by explicitly not permitting the removal – or waiving – of
any potential pre-existing “rights” to the data; to the extent
that such rights might exist around the data, they would not
be affected by virtue of them having been submitted to
GISAID.45 The unique sharing mechanisms thus ensure that
inherent rights (such as intellectual property rights) are not
forfeit when sharing data.46 In many ways, the successful de-
velopment of this DAA offering additional legal protections
and clarity wouldmark the key to GISAID’s new virus sharing
mechanism.
EpiFlu™: creating a new inﬂuenza database
In parallel to the legal access agreement, it would also be nec-
essary to develop the actual database itself – especially with the
closing of the existing database at Los Alamos. Decisions
would have to be made about where to physically locate the
new database, how to design its structure and features, as well
as making practical arrangements for its day-to-day running.
In February 2007, it was announced that the GISAID initiative
would collaborate with a Swiss consortium consisting of the
Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics (SIB), and the Swiss bioin-
formatics company SmartGene. SmartGene would provide40Ibid.
41McDowell, ‘Indonesia agrees to hand bird ﬂu information’.
42GISAID EpiFlu™ Database Access Agreement © 2008–2016. Freunde von
GISAID e.V. Available at: http://gisaid.org/DAA. [Accessed 23 March 2016].
43Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.).
26. September 2016. See also Lawrence O. Gostin, Alexandra Phelan, Michael
A. Stoto, John D. Kraemer and Srinath Reddy. ‘Virus sharing, genetic sequenc-
ing, and global health security’. Science. 345(6202): 1295–1296.
44Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.). 26
September 2016.
45Interview with Peter Bogner.
46Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany. ‘On Substantive Issues and
Concerns Regarding the PIP Framework and ITS Implementation’. Special Ses-
sion of the PIP Advisory Group, 13 October 2015.
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secure storage and analysis of the inﬂuenza data, whilst SIB
would complement genetic sequence information with high-
quality protein annotation provided by the team of lead scien-
tist Amos Bairoch, who was well known for having developed
the Swiss-Prot protein knowledge database.47 Those initial ar-
rangements for a new database would later become embroiled
in complex legal disputes around contractual obligations and
the ﬂow of public funds from the USA, via the World Health
Organization.48 This resulted in GISAID establishing a new
EpiFlu™ database in Germany in 2009, following the German
government’s proposal to ensure GISAID’s continuation by
acting as its new ofﬁcial host.49
To design the new database, GISAID used the same techni-
cal staff (today’s Database Technical Group) composed of ex-
perts who held daily responsibilities for the sequencing
activities at leading institutions such as the US’ CDC, the Na-
tional Institute for Medical Research in London, as well as the
WHO Collaborating Centres in Beijing, Melbourne, and
Tokyo, or who had worked on the design of the now defunct
Los Alamos Inﬂuenza Database (Schnirring, 2009). The new
EpiFlu™ database in Germany was then developed by the
Max Planck Institut for Informatics (in Saarbruecken) in con-
sultation with the wider scientiﬁc community.50 Because the
data that had been uploaded into the original EpiFlu™ data-
base still belonged to those who supplied it (rather than to
SIB), the data could then be migrated to the new database in
Germany following the consent of the original contributors
(Greenemeier, 2009).
With the move to Germany, responsibility for hosting the
EpiFlu™ database and GISAID platform would henceforth rest
with the German government.51 Four German institutions in
particular would play central roles: (1) the Federal Ministry of
Food and Agriculture representing Germany; (2) the Friedrich
Loefﬂer Institute (Germany’s Federal Research Institute for
Animal Health) responsible for data quality; (3) the Federal
Ofﬁce for Agriculture and Food for the technical hosting of
the database; and (4) the Max Planck-Institute for Informatics,
which would develop a new software application. In 2011, the
Federal Republic of Germany and GISAID also announced that
the German government would be the long-term host of the
EpiFlu™ database and GISAID platform, which it continues to
do to this day.52 Ensuring the proper design, implementation,
and sustainability of the new EpiFlu™ database thus marked a
second key dimension in GISAID’s data sharing mechanism.
Developing a governance structure
Establishing an appropriate governance structure formed the
ﬁnal element. Given the scientiﬁc and political sensitivities
surrounding inﬂuenza virus data, a proper governance struc-
ture would be vital to ensuring the legitimacy, scientiﬁc cred-
ibility, independence, and sustainability of the new initiative.
Indeed, without such a structure, it would be difﬁcult to build
the requisite level of trust amongst scientists and governments
necessary for them to agree to share the data with the new ini-
tiative. GISAID’s governance structure would thus come to
comprise of three independently operating bodies: (1) a board
of trustees charged with securing the independence of GISAID
from political or commercial interests; (2) the Scientiﬁc Advi-
sory Council, providing scientiﬁc inputs and oversight of the
initiative; and (3) the Database Technical Group, offering ex-
pertise in developing the database.53
In the end, then, it took a good year and a half to move
from the initial aspiration for a new global consortium
expressed in the 2006Nature letter, to ﬁnalizing all of the care-
ful legal, practical, and governance arrangements needed for
launching a new virus data sharing platform. Getting the
GISAID sharing mechanism off the ground ended up being
much more than just a technical challenge of developing a
new inﬂuenza database. Although the data and database re-
main central to the enterprise, GISAID represents a much
wider international initiative comprising the EpiFlu™ database
alongside its innovative sharing mechanism (enshrined it its
database access agreement), as well as its wider governance
structure. All three elements are critical to achieving its aim
of actively promoting the timely international sharing of all
inﬂuenza virus data. Once these elements were in place,
GISAID could ofﬁcially be launched in Geneva on the occa-
sion of the 61st World Health Assembly in May 2008.54
The initiative’s activities in different countries (especially
China, Indonesia, and the USA) were later streamlined by
47‘Swiss Consortium to Manage GISAID Database.’ GISAID/Swiss Institute of
Bioinformatics/SmartGene Press Release. 19 February 2009; Email correspon-
dence between Amos Bairoch and Peter Bogner. 27 September 2006.
48Robin McDowell, ‘Inﬂuenza Scientists, WHO face off in virus row’. The As-
sociated Press. 3 October 2008.
49‘Aigner unterstützt Ansiedlung einer internationalen Inﬂuenza-Datenbank in
Bonn’. German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 16 October 2009.
Available at: http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/2009/249-
Ai-Inﬂuenza-Datenbank%20Bonn.html [Accessed 23 March 2016]
50‘GISAID Launches Second Inﬂuenza Database’. GISAID Foundation Press
Release. 14 September 2009. Available at: http://www.prlog.org/10340963-
gisaid-launches-second-inﬂuenza-database.html. [Accessed 13 January 2016].
51CIDRAP, ’German government to host ﬂu database’, 20 October 2009
(http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2009/10/german-government-
host-ﬂu-database) [Accessed 07 January 2016].
52German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (http://www.bmel.de/EN/
Ministry/Research-Innovation/_Texte/Inﬂuenza-Database-EpiFlu.html)
[Accessed 07 January 2016].
53GISAID, “Publically accessible EpiFlu database featuring the world’s most
complete collection of Inﬂuenza data” (http://www.ble.de/SharedDocs/Down-
loads/06_Dienstleistungen/07_DienstleistungszentrumIT/100420_GISAID-
Flyer.pdf?__blob = publicationFile) [Accessed 30 November 2015].
54GISAID, “Publicly accessible EpiFlu™ 2.0 Database featuring the world’s most
current and complete collection of Inﬂuenza Data”. Available at: http://www.
inﬂuenza.spb.ru/ﬁles/GISAID_Flyer.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2016].
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formalizing them into a registered nonproﬁt association in
Germany operated exclusively for charitable, scientiﬁc, and
educational purposes – called “Freunde von GISAID e.V.
[Friends of GISAID]”55 In 2013, the German government also
reafﬁrmed its long-term commitment to host the GISAID plat-
form and the EpiFlu™ database, ensuring its sustainability.56
Wider operations, including user management, bilateral
consultations with member states and dialogue with interna-
tional organizations, or scientiﬁc matters remain GISAID’s
responsibility.57 GISAID similarly handles registrations and
technical support questions.58 GISAID today also has other
public-private partnerships – with the US Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention and Singapore’s Agency for Science,
Technology & Research – which contribute to the develop-
ment of technology and the educational programmes of the
initiative.59
GISAID’s contribution to global health
Has GISAID been successful in meeting its aims and objec-
tives? As the initiative marks its 10th anniversary, there is sub-
stantial evidence of a sustained track-record of successfully
facilitating the international sharing of inﬂuenza virus data.
Indeed, ﬁve contributions of GISAID to global health stand
out: (1) collating the most comprehensive repository of inﬂu-
enza genetic sequences, as well as associated clinical and epi-
demiological metadata; (2) facilitating the rapid sharing of
potentially pandemic virus data during recent outbreaks; (3)
supporting the WHO’s bi-annual inﬂuenza vaccine virus rec-
ommendation; (4) developing informal mechanisms for con-
ﬂict resolution around the sharing of virus data; and (5)
building greater trust with many low- and middle-income
countries key to global pandemic preparedness.
Comprehensive international inﬂuenza virus
data
Since its formal launch GISAID has rapidly built up an inter-
national user base comprising more than 6500 users.60 Those
users today span individuals at universities, research institutes
and public health organizations, clinicians, animal health ex-
perts, bioinformaticians, epidemiologists, and members of in-
dustry from around the world.61 The fact that GISAID is now
widely used by the WHO – comprising the WHO Collaborat-
ing Centres for Inﬂuenza, the world’s National Inﬂuenza Cen-
ters, and others62 – has helped GISAID collate the most
complete repository of high-quality inﬂuenza data in the
world.63 Inﬂuenza data curated by a combination of auto-
matic and manual steps from more than 850 institutions are
now held and governed by the GISAID database access
agreement.64
The EpiFlu™ database today contains the genetic sequences
of more than 1,000 inﬂuenza viruses with Human Pandemic
Potential (IVHPP).65 The most recent human inﬂuenza se-
quences – human isolates of the subtypes H5N1, H6N1,
H7N3, H7N7, H7N9, H9N2, H10N8, and H3N2 – are all
contained in the database.66 The database also holds se-
quences from others hosts –with (as of 2014) humansmaking
up approximately 69% of data, avian species 19%, and other
mammals like swine 10%.67 Geographically, data is received
from around the world, with approximately 36% of submis-
sions coming from Asia, 29% from North America, and
22% from Europe, 5% from Oceania, 4% from Africa and
55GISAID, “Publically accessible EpiFlu database featuring the world’s most
complete collection of Inﬂuenza data” (http://www.ble.de/SharedDocs/Down-
loads/06_Dienstleistungen/07_DienstleistungszentrumIT/100420_GISAID-
Flyer.pdf?__blob = publicationFile) [Accessed 30 November 2015]; Corre-
spondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.). 3 October
2016; Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. ‘BMEL unterstuetzt den
Kampf gegen Inﬂuenzaviren’. Press Release. 5 November 2014. Available at:
http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/2014/277-KL-GISAID.
html. [Accessed 6 October 2016].
56Correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.). 3
October 2016.
57Cooperation Agreement between Freunde von GISAID e.V. [Friends of
GISAID] and the Bundesministerium fuer Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft
[German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture]. 5 November 2014, p. 3.
58Ibid.
59Correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.). 3
October 2016.
60Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.).
26. September 2016.
61PIP Framework Advisory Group, ‘Draft optimal characteristics of an
inﬂuenza genetic sequence data sharing system under the pip framework’.
2015. Available at: http://www.who.int/inﬂuenza/pip/advisory_group/draft_
twg_doc.pdf. [Accessed 3 December 2015].
62‘WHO Global Inﬂuenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS)’. Avail-
able at: http://www.inﬂuenzacentre.org/centre_GISRS.htm. [Accessed 5 March
2016].
63PIP Framework Advisory Group, ‘Draft optimal characteristics of an
inﬂuenza genetic sequence data sharing system under the pip framework’.
2015. Available at: http://www.who.int/inﬂuenza/pip/advisory_group/draft_
twg_doc.pdf. [Accessed 3 December 2015].
64Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.).
26. September 2016.
65The GISAID Initiative website (http://gisaid.org) [Accessed 11 January 2016];
PIP Framework Advisory Group, ‘Draft optimal characteristics of an inﬂuenza
genetic sequence data sharing system under the pip framework’. 2015. Avail-
able at: http://www.who.int/inﬂuenza/pip/advisory_group/draft_twg_doc.pdf.
[Accessed 3 December 2015].
66GISAID, “EpiFlu™ database features and tools presentation” WHO-GISAID
training workshop, St Petersburg 28–29 August, 2014, WHO-GISAID training
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4% from South America (as of 2014).68 At the end of 2015, the
EpiFlu™ database broke through the symbolic threshold of
holding 500,000 genetic sequences.69 By October 2016, this
number had risen to more than 650,000 genetic sequences.70
Data directly submitted to the EpiFlu™ database are also
regularly complemented with sequence data deposited into
public domain archives that are part of the International Nu-
cleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (covering DDBJ,
EMBL-EBI, and NCBI). Of the 172,322 virus isolates held in
the EpiFlu™ database (as of 4 October 2016), around 40%
(65,915) were submitted to GISAID directly, and approxi-
mately 60% (106,407) were initially uploaded through the In-
ternational Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration
(INSDC).71 The EpiFlu™ database thus holds both the se-
quence information submitted directly through the GISAID
platform, as well as those submitted to INSDC databases. In
light of GISAID’s emphasis on hosting high-quality data, the
latter data go through a process of further curation before be-
ing incorporated into the EpiFlu™ database. Given how rap-
idly inﬂuenza viruses change, moreover, the ability of the
GISAID sharing mechanism to attract recent data is particu-
larly signiﬁcant. Of the data contained in the EpiFlu™ database
from viruses collected solely over the past year, 81%were sub-
mitted directly to GISAID – and 93% for viruses collected
over the last 6months.72
Beyond genetic sequence data, the EpiFlu™ database also
stores and provides around 50 different ﬁelds of associatedmeta-
data (of which most are searchable).73 Such metadata includes
date of specimen collection, specimen source, date of virus har-
vest, antiviral susceptibility, and – for human samples – patient
information such as age, gender, and health status.74 Along with
a number of data analysis tools integrated into the GISAID plat-
form, these additional data are seen by many researchers to be
valuable features of the EpiFlu™ database, including for the
purposes of surveillance and pandemic preparedness.75 At the
time of writing, plans were also underway to launch the
next-generation of the database – EpiFlu™ 2.0 – with funding
provided from 2013 to 2016 through the European Union’s
Research and Innovation funding programme.76 According to
the directors of the core WHO Collaborating Centres for
Inﬂuenza, GISAID has rapidly emerged as an essential resource
and an “irreplaceable cornerstone for public and animal health
in the global ﬁght against inﬂuenza” upon which the inﬂuenza
community now depends.77
Global health security: encouraging rapid data
sharing during outbreaks
GISAID has also demonstrated its ability to promote the rapid
sharing of virus data during several key outbreaks of wider
concern to global health security. Indonesia’s 2008 decision
to resume sharing H5N1 data through GISAID was hailed as
a diplomatic triumph.78 GISAID would again play a key role
in the 2009 outbreak of pandemic H1N1. In April 2009, the
ﬁrst news of the novel H1N1 virus initially threatened to over-
whelm the database, yet registrations were maintained around
the clock to ensure everyone had access to the data and could
share early detection ﬁndings with health authorities.79 By
April 25, the US CDC had uploaded the ﬁrst full genome
sequence of the new virus from initial US cases into GISAID,
instantly giving the research community its ﬁrst detailed look
at novel H1N1.80 That information was also used for develop-
ing new diagnostics for the virus,81 as well as for subsequent
attempts to develop new vaccines for pandemic H1N1.82
More recently, GISAIDwas again used for the rapid sharing
of data about the potentially pandemic H7N9 virus that
caused human deaths in China and therefore also raised sig-
niﬁcant international concern. China reported the H7N9 out-
break to the WHO on 31 March 2013, just 6weeks after the
ﬁrst known person fell ill.83 On the same day, it published
the genomic sequences of viruses from the three human cases
then identiﬁed on the database of GISAID, along with sharing
the data and live virus with the WHO GISRS and other
68Ibid.
69The GISAID Initiative website (http://gisaid.org) [Accessed 7 January 2016].
70Search of EpiFlu Database performed on 4 October 2016.
71Search of EpiFlu Database performed on 4 October 2016.
72Search of EpiFlu Database performed on 4 October 2016.
73Email correspondence with GISAID Initiative (Freunde von GISAID e.V.).
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2015. Available at: http://www.who.int/inﬂuenza/pip/advisory_group/
draft_twg_doc.pdf. [Accessed 3 December 2015].
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76European Commission PREDEMICS Consortium. Available at: http://cordis.
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77Letter of the Directors of the World Health Organization Collaborating
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78Interview with Masato Tashiro.
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Available at: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2009/06/pan-
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H1N1_Vaccine_WHO.html. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
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laboratories.84 Using the data, the new virus genes could be
synthesized in the USA in a matter of days, thus enabling
the vaccine company Novartis to also rapidly develop a new
vaccine.85 Since that time, other companies have also used
data in GISAID to develop new H7N9 vaccines.86 GISAID
thus plays a crucial role in the timely exchange of information
integral to the selection of pre-pandemic vaccine viruses.87
Strain selection for the seasonal ﬂu vaccines
Beyond the specter of pandemic ﬂu, EpiFlu™ also contains the
most up-to-date collection of data on seasonal inﬂuenza vi-
ruses (Neher and Bedford, 2015). The EpiFlu™ database gen-
erally receives submissions of data from current/novel strains
signiﬁcantly quicker than data generated from retrospective
studies.88 The EpiFlu™ database is thus routinely used during
the bi-annual process of selecting viruses that will form the ba-
sis for the seasonal ﬂu vaccine in the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres. Data on seasonal human inﬂuenza viruses for
the biannual vaccine strain consultation meetings (VCM) are
deposited byWHOCollaborating Centres within a time-frame
of days to a few weeks of sequencing, depending on urgency
and other circumstances.89 Several of the WHO Collaborating
Centres ﬁrst used the database in September 2008 (following
its earlier launch inMay of that year) tomake their recommen-
dations for the Southern Hemisphere 2009 seasonal ﬂu vac-
cine, and all of the centres subsequently used it in February
2009, to make recommendations for the Northern Hemi-
sphere 2009–2010 vaccine.90 Since that time, GISAID has been
consistently relied upon by WHO Collaborating Centres for
this selection process – giving the database simultaneous global
health utility for pandemic and seasonal ﬂu.91
Resolving potential conﬂicts amongst
stakeholders
Over the years, GISAID has also evolved a track record of suc-
cessfully managing potential tensions and conﬂicts between
stakeholders within the consortium. This became especially
clear over the 2013 sharing of Chinese H7N9 virus data, which
led to two sets of tensions. First, it emerged on 5 April 2013 that
the vaccine company Novartis and the J. Craig Venter Institute
were planning to use the sequences uploaded into GISAID to
develop a new H7N9 vaccine with the support of the US
CDC and with funding from the US government (Butler and
Cyranoski, 2013). Because of time constraints and immense
concern about the lethalality of the virus, however, they initially
proceeded without involving the Chinese researchers. They, in
turn, felt that this move was not in the spirit of GISAID’s data
access agreement, which required data users to make best ef-
forts to collaborate with the originating laboratory responsible
for obtaining the specimens. At this point, GISAID’s president
stepped in and was able to mitigate the situation because of his
close ties with the parties involved. Following discussions be-
tween the parties, the Chinese communicated to GISAID that
they were satisﬁed that Novartis and its partners were
engaging with China in a collaborative effort, and the vaccine
development plans were able to proceed.92 Bogner was later
commended for his efforts in this matter by both the former
Head of Research at Novartis, Philip Dormitzer, as well as the
head of the Chinese National Inﬂuenza Centre, Yuelong Shu.93
A second source of tension emerged around the same time
when the Chinese scientists submitted their ﬁrst major scien-
tiﬁc paper on H7N9, including analyses of the sequences, to
the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine. The Chinese
researchers learned that theymight be scooped, as amajor anal-
ysis of the H7N9 virus was already due to come out in the
journal Eurosurveillance on 10 April, withMasato Tashiro (then
director of the WHO’s Collaborating Centre in Tokyo) as a co-
author. Tashiro claims a draft of the paper was sent to the
Chinese researchers along with an offer of co-authorship,
which was declined.94 Bogner again played a key role behind
the scenes in brokering a solution by effectively raising concerns
of scientiﬁc etiquette that could be amicably resolved. Tashiro
was asked to delay publication until after the Chinese research
publication on 11 April, and their publication was published
later – albeit still on the same day (Butler and Cyranoski,
2013). Although the episode conﬁrmed the continuing tensions
that exist around the international sharing of virus data, it also
showed that such tensions could be constructively managed
within the framework and spirit of GISAID.
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Building trust internationally
Despite being a relative newcomer to the global health land-
scape, GISAID has already garnered a reputation for building
trust and respect internationally.95 The fact that a substantial
proportion of the inﬂuenza sequences deposited in GISAID’s
database originate from Asia and Africa is no coincidence.96
GISAID gave many LMICs the feeling that their concerns mat-
ter and that users of GISAID are treated equally.97 The list of
countries that have submitted data thus includes laboratories
located in Vietnam, Brazil, Argentina, Cambodia, Thailand,
India, Chile, Kenya, and Morocco.98 It also includes countries
that are deemed, because of their geographical location and role
in responding to past outbreaks, to be central to global pan-
demic preparedness – including Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt,
and China (including Hong Kong).99 Overall, 201 countries
and territories around the world participate in GISAID.100
This trust from many low-income and middle-income
countries is further nurtured through international work-
shops instructing researchers from around the world how to
work and analyse data generated from viruses isolated in their
region. To this end, GISAID has partnered with a number of
other organizations such as the WHO’s GISRS, the Antiviral
Group of the International Society for Inﬂuenza and Other
Respiratory Viruses Diseases (ISIRV), the PREDEMICS
Consortium, and the Tan Tock Seng Hospital to host
workshops in Africa, Asia, Russia, Europe, and the USA.101
Those workshops help to build further trust (as well as
capacity) around the international sharing of inﬂuenza virus
information amongst researchers from low-income and
middle-income countries.
GISAID has also enjoyed other forms of international
recognition. A meeting of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) recognized GISAID in 2009 for encouraging
the sharing of inﬂuenza genetic data.102 Its role in moving
towards greater transparency and access concerning inﬂuenza vi-
rus genetic sequence data was also recognized by the 64thWorld
Health Assembly in 2011.103 Keiji Fukuda, in his capacity as
Assistant Director-General for Health Security at the WHO at
the time, described GISAID as a “critically important and techni-
cally advanced new platform” that “provides an important
option for sharing genetic sequence and epidemiological data”
(Fukuda, 2011). The hosting of the database and platform by
the German government is also seen to provide an important
component of the trust GISAID now enjoys in many
countries.104 A ﬁnal, but critical, component to maintaining this
trust is GISAID’s declaration that – since its formation – neither
the initiative, its management, nor its board members have
received research support, investment interests, or performed
any contract work for industry or other commercial entities.105
Conclusion
GISAID may have had an unlikely birth as a new global health
initiative –with an unusually strong role played by an energetic,
inﬂuential, and dedicated philanthropist without a prior back-
ground in global health. As the initiative marks its 10th anni-
versary, however, it is evident that GISAID is now making
signiﬁcant contributions to global health. Five such contribu-
tions stand out: (1) collating the most complete repository of
high-quality inﬂuenza virus data; (2) facilitating the rapid shar-
ing of potentially pandemic virus information during recent
outbreaks; (3) informing theWHO’s biannual seasonal ﬂu vac-
cine strain selection process; (4) developing informal mecha-
nisms for conﬂict resolution; and (5) building greater trust
with low-income and middle-income countries key to pan-
demic preparedness. Indeed, an array of interviewees pointed
out that there is now widely perceived merit in GISAID’s for-
mula for balancing the need for control and openness, as well
as the way it seeks to reconcile the competing imperatives of
science, public health, and business.106 A number of inter-
viewees within and outside of GISAID variously felt that it is
functioning well as a mechanism and proving its value,107 that
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there is a clear need for it,108 that it is (successfully) contribut-
ing to changing habits around virus sharing,109 and that it has
now effectively become the “go-to” source for inﬂuenza infor-
mation, especially when new outbreaks happen.110
That said, even today it remains hard to know just how
much genetic sequence data are still not being shared. Without
knowing how many inﬂuenza viruses are being sequenced in-
ternationally (and when they are being sequenced), it is simply
impossible to tell.111 Some countries evidently prefer to share
inﬂuenza data through GISAID rather than through other plat-
forms that do not provide contributors with the same levels of
protection yet some interviewees also expressed suspicion that
– especially in the area of animal health – there still is much
information that is not being shared, and that some countries
are still only sharing a small proportion of information.112
Although GISAID has developed a distinct ethos for shar-
ing, moreover, there are also natural limits regarding its ability
to ensure that the terms of its access agreement are adhered to.
Limiting access – and even outright exclusion – of those who
violate the terms of the access agreement remains a credible
sanction, and one that has been used in the past. According
to GISAID, the percentage of all active users whose access cre-
dentials to the GISAID platform have been revoked at the time
of writing is around 0.16%.113 At present, however, GISAID is
only able to trace who is accessing information, not whether
people are passing this information on to others.114 GISAID
maintains that if such data subsequently surfaces, they do have
means to prove someone has illegally obtained the data –
meaning that data contributors who suspect violations could
seek to pursue this through legal channels.115 Nor, of course,
can there be ultimate guarantees that people will adhere to
these rules when confronting all the pressures of a pandemic
situation in future, although the initiative has now developed
a successful track record of navigating such situations.116
Looking forward, there are at least three challenges that
GISAID will need to navigate over the medium to long term.
One such longer-term challengementioned by several respon-
dents revolves around the future leadership of the initiative.
On the one hand, the material sustainability of the initiative
is ensured for the foreseeable future through vital support
provided by the federal government of Germany.117 On the
other hand, it is evident that the personal investment of signif-
icant amounts of time, energy, expertise, skill, and commit-
ment by its philanthropic champion has been central to the
success of GISAID.118 The longer term question of who will
continue to provide wider leadership and the championing
of GISAID will have to be addressed. Towards this end, the
German government recently called for the institutionaliza-
tion of GISAID to ensure its longevity.119
A second challenging area for GISAID are the ongoing ne-
gotiations around the Pandemic Inﬂuenza Preparedness (PIP)
Framework. The PIP framework creates responsibilities for
the sharing of biological samples of inﬂuenza viruses with
pandemic potential as well as providing a mechanism – par-
tially funded by industry contributions – for the provisions
of beneﬁts (like medicines and vaccines) to affected countries.
The question of whether genetic sequences data (as opposed
to physical specimens) should also be governed by the frame-
work proved too sensitive to be resolved during the initial ne-
gotiations for the PIP framework (Gostin et al., 2014). At the
time of writing, GISAID is thus having to navigate a complex
and sensitive set of diplomatic negotiations around the future
role of genetic sequence data in the framework, with poten-
tially considerable ramiﬁcations for the future of the initiative.
Probably, the biggest question to arise from GISAID’s suc-
cess, however, is whether its sharing mechanism can be ex-
tended to also cover other viral diseases and stand for a
wider paradigm shift in improving international data sharing.
As we have already seen several times over the past decade, in-
ﬂuenza is not the only potentially lethal infectious disease that
the world confronts, and it remains to be seen whether
GISAID has both the aspiration and capacity to expand into
other lethal viral diseases – such as Ebola, MERS, West Nile
Virus, and other zoonotic diseases.120 There are certainly signs
that this data sharing problem alsomanifested itself during the
more recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, (Yozwiak et al.,
2015) as well as the spread of Zika virus.121 Although GISAID
was approached to extend its scope to include Ebola viruses,
GISAID’s leadership felt at the time that this was beyond its
capacity. Yet Ebola is clearly another disease that shows more
generally that the spread of viruses and their husbandry sys-
tems do not align naturally with political boundaries.122 Here
too, as in a number of other lethal infectious diseases,
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protecting populations will require creative and sustained
efforts to carefully reconcile data, disease, and diplomacy.
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